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1. Introduction 
The overall size as well as the tax revenue bundle of the local public sector in multi-tiered structures of 
government are the outcomes of the decentralized decision-making process subject to the fiscal rules 
set by central (state) governments. As documented by Anderson (2006) and Wolman et al. (2008) for 
the US, and by Joumard and Kongsrud (2003) and Sutherland et al. (2005) for the OECD countries, 
top-down tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) are frequently so tight and pervasive as to jeopardize 
the very principle of local fiscal autonomy. 
This paper aims at investigating how state-wide revenue raising limitation rules shape local 
governments’ budget constraints. In particular, it focuses on the kinks that are typically generated by 
tax floors and caps, and evaluates their effects on the determination of the local tax mix and on the 
response of local public expenditures to grants. 
As far as the latter issue is concerned, a vast literature – most recently reviewed by Inman (2009) – has 
investigated and sought to explain the anomalously high response of local spending to grants relative to 
the response to private income. That empirical anomaly has been dubbed the “flypaper effect,” in the 
sense that money from central government sticks where it hits.1 
Two broad kinds of explanations of the flypaper effect have been offered in the literature (Hines and 
Thaler, 1995). The first has to do with a variety of specification and estimation errors that applied 
researchers would have kept making for decades. Those errors range from mistakenly treating matching 
grants as if they were lump-sum to the omission of important variables - such as unobserved population 
characteristics or spatial lags of other governments’ policies - that are simultaneously correlated with 
grants and local public expenditures. The second explanation relies on the argument that the political 
representation process is substantially richer than the one postulated by the standard neoclassical 
                                                          
1According to Inman (2009), over 3,500 research papers exist documenting and seeking to explain the flypaper effect. 
Payne (2009) offers an insightful wide-ranging review of the more recent research into the mirror phenomenon of crowd-
out. 
model: asymmetric information, loss aversion, fiscal illusion, separate mental accounting, special 
interest groups, and citizens’ inability to write complete contracts with their elected officials would be 
responsible for the lack of fungibility between public and private uses of money, and would cause the 
observed large flypaper effect. 
In this paper, we put forward and test the idea that the so-called flypaper effect might be the result of 
the limitations imposed by upper levels of governments on local authorities. In particular, we start from 
a description of the process by which the local tax mix – that is, the choice of the weight to be 
attributed to different sources of own revenue – is determined, and ask ourselves what consequences 
are to be expected when the national government imposes local tax rate limitations. 
The above features, i.e., a multiplicity of local sources of own revenue and the presence of tax rate 
limitations, are observed in virtually all western democracies, so that the decentralized government 
finance archetype discussed here can be applied to a variety of countries, be they unitary or federal. 
The analysis shows that excess sensitivity of local public spending to grants arises naturally in the 
endogenously generated constrained tax mix. In particular, we show that the effect of private 
community income on local public spending should be expected to be tiny or nil in the presence of 
binding limitations on all local tax revenue sources. On the other hand, grants should be predicted to 
have a large - actually, a one-for-one - impact on local expenditures. Interestingly, a binding cap on just 
one of the available own revenue sources is enough to generate some form of flypaper effect, in the 
sense of an excess sensitivity of local spending to grants, and the above result holds when either upper 
or lower tax limitations are in place.  
Finally, since excess sensitivity of local public spending should be predicted to arise and generally 
tends to manifest itself both when grants increase and when they decrease, the flypaper effect label 
seems an inappropriate or even misleading one. In fact, excess sensitivity of local public expenditures 
to grants cannot in general be interpreted as a sinister symptom of overspending. 
While the existing literature seems to have almost universally overlooked the potential impact of tax 
and expenditure limitation systems on the sensitivity of local public spending to exogenous variations 
in grants, two recent papers have brought the fiscal limitations issue into the empirical investigation of 
the flypaper effect. Lutz (2010) conjectures that previous evidence of a flypaper effect might have 
arisen from state constraints preventing local governments from selecting their preferred bundle of 
public goods, and provides evidence of equivalence between grants and income from a school finance 
reform in New Hampshire “one of only five states with no state-imposed limitations on the taxing or 
spending power of local governments” (Lutz, 2010: p. 317). Brooks and Phillips (2010) represent the 
first formal statement and empirical test of the hypothesis that restrictive fiscal institutions might be 
responsible for the flypaper effect. They use data on the US Community Development Block Grant 
(CDBG) program and argue that state TELs may systematically force city governments to 
underprovide local public goods and therefore increase the stimulative effect of federal grants on city 
spending. However, since they do not observe either the municipal tax bundle or whether a revenue 
raising constraint is binding in any given city, they have to rely on a state-level index of fiscal 
constraints and ignore altogether both the municipal choice as to own revenue source diversification 
and the issue of endogenous selection of a city government into the fiscally constrained status. 
In order to show how the tax limitation mechanism works and how it affects the response of local 
spending to grants, this paper reports the results of an empirical application to Italian provincial 
governments’ data. An attractive feature of Italian Provinces is that their own tax revenue sources (a 
tax on vehicle registrations, a tax on electricity consumption for business uses, and a waste 
management surcharge) are subject to strict and frequently binding upper as well as lower tax rate 
limitations. In particular, the empirical analysis exploits the clustering of provincial authorities at the 
corners produced by those tax limitation rules, and reports the results of the estimation of the effect of 
grants on local expenditures for two groups of authorities - those severely affected by tax limits and 
those that are only mildly affected. The results show the former authorities exhibit a sensitivity of 
spending to state grants that is significantly higher than the latter. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic intuition that the flypaper effect can be 
generated by central constraints on local tax choices. Section 3 extends the argument to the case of 
multiple tax instruments (the local tax mix). Sections 4 illustrates the Italian institutional system of 
local government, describes the data for the empirical application, and reports and discusses the main 
empirical results. Finally, section 5 concludes by discussing the applicability of the framework outlined 
in this paper to other institutional settings. 
 
2. Communicating vessels 
Figure 1 gives a stylized graphical representation of the allocation of resources between private 
consumption and consumption of local public services in a given local jurisdiction n, under different 
tax decentralization arrangements. Say that the left-hand side vessel (vpn) represents consumption of 
private goods out of community n private income (in), and the right-hand side vessel (vgn) represents 
consumption of local public services. The structure depicted in (1.a) amounts to a perfect tax 
centralization arrangement, where expenditures on local public services are entirely funded by central 
government grants gn. In the absence of local tax instruments, the local government cannot affect the 
level of local public services (that are entirely determined by the size of central grants) and nothing 
ensures that the allocation of resources to private consumption and local public services reflects the 
preferences of the local community. 
In the central picture (1.b), the two vessels communicate via local tax revenues. Now local government 
n can decide to transfer resources from the private to the local public sector by setting a positive tax 
rate. 
Figure 1 Communicating vessels 
(1.a) 
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In order for local public services to be provided at the level that is optimal for the local community, and 
if we assume that one euro of private income can be transformed into one euro of local public spending 
through local tax revenues, the marginal utility from private consumption should be equal to the 
marginal utility of local public services consumption. Just like communicating vessels, where the force 
of gravity requires hydrostatic pressure to be balanced out in the two vessels regardless of their relative 
sizes, the welfare optimization forces make resources (tax receipts tn) flow from vessel vpn to vessel vgn. 
An important consequence of the just described equilibrium is that whether additional resources are 
poured into vpn (by an exogenous increase in community’s private income) or into vgn (by an increase in 
state grants), we should expect the same allocation of private and public consumption to result by the 
law of communicating vessels. 
In the lower picture (1.c), it is assumed instead that the local jurisdiction, while still receiving grants 
from central government (gn) and being able to set a local tax, is subject to a tax rate cap, meaning that 
it cannot raise revenues above the level represented by the rectangle thn. The tax cap is binding if local 
government n is forced to raise less revenues than it would find optimal – the case described in the 
figure, where the ideal level of local taxes is the larger rectangle tn. 
Due to the cap, the condition for optimal public good provision will not be satisfied: more resources 
ought to flow from the left to the right vessel in order to equate the pressure in the two vessels. 
In this case, an additional unit of private income cannot, because of the tax limitation, be transformed 
into local public services even if local residents were willing to do so. On the other hand, if additional 
grants are poured into (pumped out of) the local government budget, local public spending will rise 
(fall) accordingly. Local public expenditures will therefore be highly sensitive to grants, actually with a 
one-for-one response, giving rise to the so-called flypaper effect. 
 
 
3. The presence of multiple local taxes 
One might wonder if the metaphorical reasoning sketched above would still hold in a setting where 
local governments can rely on a number of different sources of own tax revenue. In order to keep the 
argument as simple and tractable as possible, consider the case of local governments being able to rely 
on two distinct tax instruments, say a tax on residential property and a tax on profits made by firms 
operating in the jurisdiction. The former is applied on domestic property value at the rate r, and the 
latter is applied on profits at the rate p, with both rates being decided by the local government subject to 
the limits imposed by state government. Assume that the state limits are such that the property tax rate 
must lie between r0 (with r0>0) and r1 (r0 ≤ r ≤ r1), and the profit tax must lie between p0 (with p0>0) 
and p1 (p0 ≤ p ≤ p1). Local public spending is funded by property tax revenues, profit tax revenues, and 
exogenous grants from central government. 
Consider a local community that is strongly against taxes: they will set both rates at the minimum 
levels: r = r0 >0 and p = p0 >0. The community is at a corner solution, in the sense that it would like to 
set both tax rates to zero (r=p=0) and set a level of spending equal to the grants received by state 
government. However, that tax mix is not admissible due to state constraints.  
What happens to that community’s choices if grants change? If grants increase, the community would 
like to further reduce taxes. However, since further tax cuts are not possible, the only option is to spend 
the extra grant. And if grants happen to decrease, the optimal response is to decrease spending 
accordingly, since raising taxes is definitely not desirable. 
On the other hand, consider a community wanting a big government and high spending, so that they set 
tax rates at maximum levels r= r1 and p= p1, while their optimal choices correspond to even higher tax 
rates. Of course, higher grants would in this case be entirely spent on more public services, thereby 
allowing the community to get closer to their desired level of spending. On the other hand, lower grants 
are necessarily accompanied by lower spending, since the community cannot increase its taxes. 
Finally, consider a community that strongly favors business taxation because it perceives it as an 
effective redistribution instrument, and vigorously opposes taxation of residents’ properties. The 
constrained tax mix would require in this case to set the maximum tax rate on business profits (p = p1) 
and the minimum tax rate on residential property (r = r0 > 0). Interestingly, the spending response to 
grants of such community will not be different than the ones observed in the previous examples. An 
extra euro received in state grants would ideally be employed to further reduce homeowners’ tax 
burden, but that is not feasible. On the other hand, a reduction in business taxation is viable, but not 
desirable. As a result, spending will increase by one euro. Similarly, any reduction in grant would 
further push towards an increase in business taxation (a non viable option): being the resident property 
tax rate higher than the optimal one, the grant cut will be accompanied by a corresponding spending 
cut. 
The above example allows us to formulate the following general predictions on the effect of tax 
limitations on the sensitivity of local public spending to grants. In the general case in which M>2 own 
tax revenue sources are available for local governments, and each of them is subject to an upper limit 
and to a lower limit, the following results are obtained: 
 In a fully constrained tax mix, i.e., when all tax limits are binding, local public spending exhibits 
little or no sensitivity to private income changes; on the other hand, local public expenditures 
respond to changes in grants on a one-for-one basis. 
 Moreover, upper-constrained authorities , i.e., authorities that set all their tax rates at their upper 
limits, lower-constrained authorities, i.e., authorities that set all their tax rates at their lower limits,, 
and lower and upper-constrained authorities , i.e., authorities that set some of their tax rates at their 
upper limits and some at their lower limits, exhibit the same sensitivity of public spending to grants. 
 Finally, in a partially constrained tax mix where some tax limits are binding and some are not: a) 
the sensitivity of local public spending to grants is smaller than it is in a fully constrained tax mix; 
b) the sensitivity of local public spending to grants is larger than it is in the absence of binding tax 
limitations. 
 
4. An application: local tax limitations in Italian Provinces 
The impact of tax limitations on the sensitivity of local public spending to grants is tested on data for 
the Italian Provinces through the years 2000 to 2007. 
The Italian system of local government is organized as a three-tier structure, with the 103 Provinces 
constituting the intermediate level of government between the regional (20 Regions) and the municipal 
(over 8,000 municipalities) ones. Provinces have responsibility for intermunicipal road construction 
and maintenance, local transportation systems, secondary education schools, waste management and 
environmental protection. Provincial expenditures rose considerably in recent years, mostly due to the 
devolution of functions from the national and regional governments. In fact, average per capita 
spending increased by about 25% in real terms between 2000 and 2007. 
Over ¾ of total current provincial spending is funded by grants from upper levels of government (State 
and Regions), with the proportion of grant-funded expenditures remaining roughly constant through the 
2000-2007 period. State grants are for the most part general and formula-based. They rely on the 
definition of a standardized spending level for each Province built on exogenous needs indicators 
falling into three broad areas (age structure of the resident population; geomorphological complexion; 
socioeconomic deprivation), as well as of a fiscal capacity index capturing the ability of each Province 
to raise own and shared revenues. In particular, Provinces are divided into four demographic bands, and 
average service cost indices for a number of mandated provincial functions and average tax bases are 
periodically computed (usually every three years) for each band. Expenditures on non-mandated 
provincial services do not enter the grant distribution scheme and must be entirely funded by own 
revenues. On the other hand, Regional grants typically finance specific functions that were devolved to 
Provinces during the decentralization process of the late 1990s. 
As a result of the above institutional arrangement, State and regional grants can to a large extent be 
considered exogenous with respect to own funding decisions by provincial governments. In particular, 
given the infrequent central assessment of spending needs and fiscal capacity, changes in provincial 
socioeconomic conditions are not promptly reflected into State grant adjustments. Moreover, the fact 
that State grants are based on a Province’s needs and fiscal capacity indices relative to its demographic 
band mean should alleviate the potential problem of grant endogeneity arising from shocks moving 
grants and local expenditures in the same direction. 
The rest of current spending is funded by three own tax revenue sources: the vehicle registration tax, 
the electricity consumption tax, and the waste management tax. The vehicle registration tax represents 
over 50% of total own tax revenues. All brand new vehicles - as well as used vehicles in case of change 
of ownership - are liable to the payment of the tax the first time they are registered in the provincial 
archive under a given owner’s name. The total tax due is made of a lump-sum amount plus a variable 
component that is related to the size, power and destination of the vehicle. As shown in table 1, central 
government establishes a lower and an upper bound on the vehicle tax parameters that Provinces can 
set, with the upper bound corresponding to a 20% higher tax burden (raised to 30% in 2007) than the 
one corresponding to the lower bound. Consequently, the decision of each Province basically consists 
in determining autonomously the surcharge rate. 
The electricity consumption tax is applied by Provinces on business uses of electricity. As shown in 
table 1, Provinces set a tax rate between a minimum of 9.3 and a maximum of 11.4 Euro cents per kW. 
Electricity tax revenues correspond to above 1/3 of total own tax revenues. 
Finally, the waste management tax is a surcharge applied by Provinces on the waste collection bill 
charged by the municipalities located in the province on all households and businesses. Table 1 shows 
that the surcharge rate must lie between 1% and 5% of the municipal levy. Revenues from the waste 
management tax amount to about 10% of total provincial own tax revenues. 
 
Table 1 Lower and upper tax limitation rules 
  2000-6 2007 
Vehicle registration tax lower 0 0 
(% surcharge on national rate) upper 20 30 
Electricity consumption tax lower 9.3 9.3 
(Euro cents per kW) upper 11.4 11.4 
Waste management tax lower 1 1 
(% surcharge on municipal levy) upper 5 5 
 
Table 2 reports the number of authorities setting tax rates at the lower and upper limits respectively. 
The data refer to the 90 Provinces (out of 103) for which all information from 2000 to 2007 is 
available. 
 
Table 2 Number of authorities (N=90) at lower and upper limits 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Vehicle lower 25 15 9 7 7 5 4 3 
 upper 55 65 71 72 73 77 79 43 
Electricity lower 66 54 43 37 34 27 18 15 
 upper 16 29 39 45 47 52 59 64 
Waste lower 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 
 upper 66 64 66 65 65 66 66 68 
 
More than half of the observations in the dataset (416 out of 720) correspond to fully bound instances, 
with all available tax sources being set at left or right corners, while in only 9 observations none of the 
constraints is binding. For about 40% of the observations either one or two tax limitations are binding, 
and in over 1/3 of the observed tax mix outcomes a lower and an upper limit are simultaneously 
binding. 
We use the Italian Provinces’ data to estimate the sensitivity of local public expenditures to changes in 
exogenous revenue sources, while allowing for heterogeneous responses depending on the degree to 
which Provinces face financing constraints. In particular, we want to verify if Provinces where state tax 
constraints are binding actually exhibit a higher sensitivity of spending to grants. 
In methodological terms, an empirical investigation of the excess sensitivity of local government 
spending to grants bears a striking similarity with two well developed lines of empirical research. The 
first concerns the inquiry into the role of financing and liquidity constraints in explaining the elasticity 
of investment to cash-flow in Q models of the firm (Bond and Meghir, 1994; Fazzari et al., 1988, Hu 
and Schiantarelli, 1998, Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, Cummins et al., 2006). The second relates to the 
borrowing constraint interpretation of the excess sensitivity of private consumption to disposable 
income in permanent income/life cycle frameworks (Jappelli et al., 1998). 
In the empirical investment and consumption literatures, the conventional approach consists in splitting 
the sample of data according to an a priori index of financing/liquidity constraint (typically related to 
the dividend payout or liquid assets to capital stock ratio for firms, and to the asset-income ratio for 
consumers), and compare the “switching regression” estimates of the sensitivity of investment 
(consumption) to cash flow (income) for two distinct subsamples: the constrained and the 
unconstrained one. 
Similarly, in order to test on panel data (i.e., when a cross-section of authorities is repeatedly observed 
over time) whether the local public spending response to changes in exogenous sources of revenue is 
affected by the tax limitation regime a local government is subject to, a time-invariant selection 
criterion can be employed and authorities assigned to either of two subsamples based on whether they 
are consistently constrained (or not constrained) during the whole period of observation. 
We therefore first split the sample based on a time-invariant indicator according to which a Province is 
“fully constrained” if tax limits are binding on all own tax revenue sources for the entire period of 
observation, and is “moderately constrained” if the authority never has all constraints binding. 
Application of the above splitting criterion leaves us with 264 observations, with 24 severely 
constrained authorities, and 20 moderately constrained authorities. Of the 24 structurally capped 
authorities, 17 were at the upper bounds on all three own tax rates for the entire period, 5 were hitting 
two upper bounds and one lower bound, one Province was at one upper and two lower bounds, and one 
Province was consistently at the three lower bounds. On the other hand, the authorities in the 
moderately constrained regime have one to two constraints binding. 
We then estimate the effect of grants on expenditures (real current spending per capita) in the switching 
regression model as described above. Grants are measured as all current financial transfers from upper 
levels of government (State and Regions), including the fixed shares of national tax revenues devolved 
to Provinces (national personal income tax and national motor-vehicle insurance tax), and are 
expressed in per capita terms. The estimation results of the effect of grants on expenditures are reported 
in the first two columns of table 3. 
 
Table 3 The estimated effect of grants on local expenditures 
 Time-invariant splitting criterion Time-varying splitting criterion 
 
Fully 
constrained 
Moderately 
constrained 
Fully 
constrained 
Moderately 
constrained 
grants  
0.975 
(0.048) 
0.722 
(0.050) 
0.986 
(0.023) 
0.792 
(0.056) 
observations 144 120 230 114 
authorities 24 20 43 
 
Notes: Fixed Province and year effects included. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Interestingly, all authorities exhibit what would be termed a flypaper effect according to conventional 
criteria in the literature. The results in table 3 show that the grant effect is large and highly significant. 
However, fully constrained authorities’ expenditures react to grants to a significantly larger extent, 
actually on a one-for-one basis. The estimate of the effect of grants on spending is around 0.7 for the 
moderately constrained subsample, while the coefficient estimate virtually equals 1 for severely bound 
Provinces.2 
In the light of those results, one might wonder whether the grant coefficient estimate is inflated by 
spurious correlation between local expenditure and grants due to omitted variables driving both. 
However, a grant coefficient estimate of around 1 in the fully constrained sample is hardly surprising, 
given that all local tax rates are frozen at their (upper or lower) limits. As for the moderately 
constrained sample, an endogeneity bias would most likely play against the point we are making here, 
in the sense of driving up the estimate of the grant coefficient and narrowing the gap between the two 
subsamples. 
A disadvantage of the separation rule adopted above, though, consists in the fact that it implies freezing 
the sample and renouncing to using information on local governments that switch from one regime to 
the other over the period of observation (Hu and Schiantarelli, 1998). An alternative empirical 
approach - based, among the others, on Bond and Meghir (1994), Jappelli et al. (1998) and Cummins et 
al. (2006) - consists in allowing for a time-varying constraint status. This implies focusing on the 
authorities that are observed to be switching between regimes over time. After excluding Provinces that 
are consistently constrained or unconstrained over the entire time period, we end up with a balanced 
panel of 43 switching Provinces over the eight years 2000-2007. Those Provinces are fully constrained 
in some years, while they are only partly constrained in other years.  
The third and fourth columns in table 3 report the estimation results for this sample. It is remarkable 
that local authorities’ expenditures exhibit the expected excess sensitivity when fully constrained (grant 
coefficient = 1), while the sensitivity of spending to grants is significantly lower (less than 0.8) when 
the same authorities are only moderately constrained, suggesting that the extent and intensity of tax 
limitations plays a role in explaining the response of local spending to grants. 
 
                                                          
2 The results are robust to the introduction of various control variables. 
5. Concluding remarks 
By explicitly recognizing and incorporating the left and right corners that are typically produced by 
state-wide limitations on local tax rates, this paper has discussed how the local tax mix is determined in 
the presence of tax limits, and has shown how excess sensitivity of local public spending to grants 
arises in the endogenously generated constrained tax mix. 
In particular, the paper has shown that the effect of private income on public spending should be 
expected to be tiny or nil in the presence of binding limitations on all local tax revenue sources, while 
grants should be predicted to have a large - actually, a one-for-one - impact on local expenditures. 
Interestingly, the above result holds when either upper or lower tax limitations are in place, and a 
binding limitation on just one of the available own revenue sources is enough to generate some form of 
flypaper effect, in the sense of an excess sensitivity of local spending to grants. In fact, since excess 
sensitivity of local public spending should be predicted to arise and generally tends to manifest itself 
both when grants increase and when they decrease, the flypaper effect label seems an inappropriate or 
even misleading one. 
By using data on the Italian Provinces over the years 2000s, the paper has exploited the clustering of 
provincial authorities at the corners generated by central government lower and upper tax limitation 
rules to estimate the sensitivity of local public expenditures to grants. The empirical evidence suggests 
that the response of local spending to grants is significantly higher for fully constrained authorities than 
for authorities that can manoeuvre at least one tax instrument.  
While the above results point to the importance of tax limitations in empirical investigations of the 
local tax mix determination process and of the responsiveness of local spending to central government 
grant policy, they also suggest that the role of alternative explanations of local public spending excess 
sensitivity cannot be ignored. Ideally, further empirical work should rely on data from local 
government finance settings where there exist a control group that is entirely unconstrained and a 
treatment group that is subject to binding tax limitations, making it possible to neatly test the 
importance of tax limitations in explaining the sensitivity of spending to grants. In addition, a 
potentially fruitful further line of research would be represented by a thorough empirical analysis of the 
effects of various kinds of limitations and mandates on local public expenditures – an important and 
frequently employed policy tool that can lead to an observed pattern of spending that is hard to 
reconcile with standard theoretical economic models. 
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